Carrots and Sticks for Teacher Colleges: An Application for an Optimal Teacher Recruitment Policy
This paper studies the optimal design of a screening and recruiting policy aimed at raising the average entrance exam scores of students entering teaching colleges. Using data from a targeted scholarship policy implemented in Chile I study how design details can have significant effects on the overall effects of the policy. Colleges would be eligble for scholarships for high scoring students but also needed to implement a cutoff score of the 50th percentile if they were to be eligible. The results of this ”carrots and sticks” policy was that the proportion of high achieving students rose by approximately 50%, although enrollment from the lower end of the distribution continued high at non participating institutions. I estimate a model of demand for teaching college and out-of-pocket expenses. I complement this analysis with the estimations of a model for the supply side decision to participate in the program or not. Counterfactual simulations show that a more lenient policy would have induced more participation and a larger overall policy effect.
- Coauthors: Adam Kapor and Cristian Sanchez
- Date: 2018